‘This image of the German plan is caricatural,’ points out Christophe Bechet. ‘It results from the amalgam into a monolithic block of the various plans drawn up by Schlieffen and his successor, Moltke the Younger, without taking into account their respective specificities. If it is undeniable that the Franco-Russian pincers obsessed the German Chief of Staff since 1893, Schlieffen’s Denkschrift of the 1905/1906 Winter is a plan to attack France uniquely. The Russian danger is not taken into account within it because the army of the Tsar had just been subjected to a crushing defeat against Japan and was no longer capable of threatening Germany on its eastern border. What is more,’ adds the historian, ‘the question of whether or not this Denkschrift is an authentic war plan or a simple work of reflection, is today passionately discussed by the history community.’

Whatever is the case, concludes Christophe Bechet in his thesis, in basing himself on the analysis of German war games and other documents recently discovered in the Bundesarchiv-militärarchiv at Fribourg im Breisgau, we can state that the date of 1905 indeed corresponds to a turning point in Schlieffen’s strategic thinking. From this key year onwards, the crossing of Belgium is assumed to be a quasi inevitable fact in the case of war against France, which would in the future probably be supported by a restored Russian army and maybe an English expeditionary force. Let us nevertheless note that the question of who out of the German army and the French army would cross the Belgian border first is not for all that resolved.

As was the habit amongst European general staff, the German officers who assisted Schlieffen and Moltke the Younger anticipated the coming war with a ‘mathematical fervour.’ From 1905 onwards, they for example itemised all the possible itineraries in Belgium. A series of complicated calculations also determined the transportation of troops by rail to the left bank of the Meuse river.

In this respect the construction from 1905 of the Remagen-Malmédy line, crossing the Eifel from east to west, offers rich information on the ambiguous links which can exist between economic and military interests. ‘The rapid densification of the rail network in the west of Germany and in the proximity of Belgium, over the 1905-1906 years, has enabled numerous historians to demonstrate a posteriori the Reich’s warlike intentions. But this shortcut is to be avoided,’ insists Christophe Bechet. ‘The concentration of German troops along the Belgian border can also be understood in the perspective of a counter offensive, in the case of a French attack through Luxemburg and the Belgian Ardennes.’

On August 4, 1914, having demanded in vain for the right of passage through Belgium, William II launched his troops massed on the Belgian border to assault the French armies which he sensed were on the point of attacking. Our neutrality is violated. The Belgian army leaves for battle. But the war would be neither fresh nor joyful. And still less of short duration.