It is interesting to note that support for the welfare state is positively correlated with a feeling of being Walloon. It thus indeed seems that this socio-economic consensus is a component of identity feeling. In the same way the Walloons highlight the values of individual freedom and tolerance in moral matters: 80% of them defend the right to abortion and 90% defend the right to euthanasia. Homosexual marriage is more controversial, but nevertheless pulls in a majority approval (56%). Finally the liberty to have ‘one’s own habitual practices and one’s own culture,’ or the freedom ‘to have one’s own religious and philosophical practices’ gathers quasi-unanimous support: 95% in both cases.

The weight of this ‘socio-liberal’ consensus gives the impression that it is it which constitutes the principal framework of Walloon identity in terms of content: a society built on tolerance and solidarity. It is certainly a hypothesis, admits Marc Jacquemain, but it is backed up by an important element, taken from an observation of the political field: it is the difficulty a radical political menu has in taking root, be it of the extreme left or the extreme right. This electoral reality is consistent with political public statements: in Wallonia, the major actors of the ‘Belgian style’ social model are not very taken with the radicalness of discourse: on no side, be it on the part of the employers, the unions or the politicians, do we hear a fundamental challenging of the principles of social dialogue.

If there is, at the heart of Walloon identity, a certain form of socio-political and cultural consensus, we can nevertheless expect this identity to be ‘placed under pressure’ in the years to come, warns Marc Jacquemain, and this is so for at least two reasons. The first is that this type of ‘socio-liberal’ consensus isolates Belgium pretty much, as the country is often considered ‘too social’ in European circles, and that both the global situation (the repercussions of the financial crisis, the debt and Euro crisis) and the local situation (the negotiations with Flanders) exert a pressure in favour of a ‘less social’ State. Thus a fiscal competition with Flanders in a ‘confederalised’ State would risk weakening even more the maintenance of the social model in Wallonia. Should this occur, it is not out of the question that here we could see a level of social conflictuality closer to that of our neighbours.

The second one is that there exists a domain in which consensus is lacking: the question of immigration divides Walloon opinion, as the replies obtained on this subject in the context of the survey carried out in 2004 seem to indicate.



Certainly the figures presented above are not in radical contradiction with the logic of ‘tolerance and solidarity’ already considered. But they show that opinion is more fractured on this subject. It is thus not out of the question that this fracture of opinion might also place Walloon consensus under pressure in the future.