War plans

In his book, Bechet takes a look at the role played by this Chief of the German General Staff, who increased his autonomy and power after the war against Austria and then against France. Above all, he takes time to examine the composition and organisation of the German army, which he shows had become increasingly distant from its competent Ministry (and hence from political power). Suffice to say here, one of the missions devolved to the Chief of the German General Staff was 'the preparation of war plans based on concrete measures to be taken during peacetime, before danger became imminent', explains the author. Incontestable proof of German premeditation? Certainly not, according to Bechet. 'It would be more logical to use a less warlike expression such as 'plans in the event of war'. And Germany was certainly not alone in playing this little game. 'Prior to 1914, the existence of 'war plans' in Germany, as in France, naturally didn't mean that the armies of these two countries were necessarily looking towards conflict.' Moreover, technological innovations, including the  use of rail transport, made it increasingly necessary to institutionalise the drafting and revision of these plans. 'Consequently,' explains Bechet, 'in France there were no fewer than 17 war plans drafted between 1871 and 1914, which were themselves divided into sub-plans and multiple variations. In Germany, the revision process was even more systematic, because the war plans changed every year'.

To what extent were these plans rigid, a reproach often directed at Schlieffen after the war? Once more, the Liege historian takes a look at the evidence. The plans were, indeed, fairly strict in terms of their initial three phases (mobilisation, transport by rail, unloading and deployment close to the theatre of operations), but were much less so for the fourth, i.e. the initial operations. 'In German military thought', explains Bechet, 'setting out the detail of the operational plan beyond the first days of the march was seen as a fantasy of armchair generals. '

The Schlieffen Plan

The need to frequently revise the plans had at its origin something other than technological evolution or rail transport capacity: the geopolitical situation of the Empire. After the French defeat in 1871 and the Congress of Berlin in 1878, which was unfavourable to Russia, Germany lived in fear of being held between the pincers of two hostile nations. 'In the minds of Wilhemine Germany's highest civil and military authorities, this led to a constant state of vigilance, as if they were defending a besieged citadel.' But around this strategic axis, the political situation simply resulted in hesitation! Moltke initially anticipated an all-out offensive to the east, believing that the fortresses on the Rhine would be sufficient to stop the French. He changed tack after the development of melanite shells, which were capable of piercing the walls of these old fortresses (the 1887/1888 plan): this time, concentration was fully focussed against France. And when French-German relations became less tense? In his last plan (1888/1889), Moltke advocated an offensive to the east! After the French-Russian military alliance of 1892, ratified in 1893-1894, Schlieffen advocated retaining two major variations - one French and one Russian -, enabling them to adapt to the flexibility of the Reich's foreign policy. But the two variations could not necessarily be applied simultaneously: they were always ready to opt for one or the other if the French-Russian alliance did not materialise on a military level. Thus, in Schlieffen's mind, Germany would have to fight against a single adversary, or both at the same time. It was his successor, Moltke the Younger who, in the winter of 1912-1913 and convinced that Germany would be obliged in any case to fight on both fronts simultaneously, was to break with this tradition (remember that Schlieffen died in 1913 and thus never saw war).