Shortly before the beginning of the conflict, Selliers de Moranville put in place a plan that clearly did not meet with the king’s approval. When the King became aware of it, the plan had already been launched. The management of the railways was informed at the last minute and officers had been working on the transport plan for three days. Every minute counted at the beginning of the war. It was therefore too late to do an about-turn and change strategy. A middle-ground position was finally adopted. Although it did not exactly suit him, the King accepted the plan, changing it slightly to place two divisions on the Meuse one at Liege and one at Namur.

Although little is known about the exact role of the King, a study of the memoirs of his main advisors makes it possible to make some assumptions on this subject: “I am convinced that it is he who had the last word. This is purely hypothetical, but I think that he may have mismanaged things when Belgium entered the war. He told himself that Selliers de Moranville would do his work reasonably well but, influenced by De Ryckel and Galet, he realized some time later that de Moranville’s ideas were a little dangerous. He adopted a middle-of-the-road position. The question I ask myself is: was the King, with his many responsibilities in so many domains as well informed as his own officers to enable him to fully understand this strategic situation? The King was probably overloaded with work, which would explain these blunders at the start of the conflict. But this is just a theory”, reveals Christophe Bechet.

A link-up with France or a retreat to Antwerp

On August 4 1914, two days after the German ultimatum, Belgium was invaded by Germany. Internationally recognized as the first combat location of the war of 1914-1918, Liege was situated directly in Germany’s sights. The taking of Liege was a “Handstreich”, known in military language as a “coup de main”. The Germans wanted to take possession of the town as soon as war was declared on Belgium. In case of resistance, Liege would become a veritable obstacle that would prevent the German plan from taking place smoothly and there was an added risk that the French and English would link up with the Belgians there. On the outer ring of Liege, the intervals between the satellite forts were known to be weak points. Without organized resistance on the part of the Belgians, they could be easily be crossed, enabling the Germans to reach the heart of the town. 

However, the Handstreich did not take place in the way that the Germans had planned. Thanks to the expected mobilization of July 31, the Belgians succeeded in organizing the defense of the town. On the other hand, the Germans quickly got the upper hand over the Belgians due to a communication error. On August 6, believing the town to be taken, General Leman ordered the retreat of the troops, even though only one German brigade occupied the town in fact.

By virtue of its status as a neutral country, Belgium made an appeal to the guarantor powers, the signatories to the Treaty of the XXIV articles (established in 1831 and legitimized in 1839). General Leman’s unfortunate mistake brought about a progressive retreat and then, due to lack of the expected support, a definitive retreat of the army to the fortified positions of Antwerp on August 18 1914. Too far for the Belgians to be able to resist side by side with the French, this position was a source of tension. The French officers did not understand why the Belgians did not link-up with their troops, while King Albert 1 remained anxious to preserve the neutrality of the country. Subsequently, the fall of Antwerp drove the Belgians behind the Yser where support from the French troops became indispensable. Four years of resistance would follow. Up to the end of the conflict, Belgium preserved its status as a neutral country, becoming a mere cobelligerent