The choice of a position close to Antwerp proved to be a prudent decision. It was defended by the Chief of General Staff, Antoine de Selliers de Moranville. He proposed a relatively traditional defense system involving a wait-and-see strategy in the center of the country. In his opinion, the army should wait until the enemy violated a border and then march to meet the enemy without straying too far from Antwerp. This central position should enable the troops to avoid being surrounded by the enemy and cut off from their base camp.

In contrast, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Baron Louis de Ryckel, advocated a new concept in the defense of the Belgian territory. Contrary to the ideas that were in vogue up to that point, he envisaged a much more offensive approach to the defense of the threatened border. He refused to abandon part of the national territory to the enemy as part of a strategy for the defense of the territory as a whole. Retreating to Antwerp should only be adopted as a last resort. For de Ryckel, it was possible to know in advance where the danger would come from thanks to warnings from diplomatic personnel who were posted in Germany and France. The army should proceed to the threatened border in order to prevent a large part of the country from becoming invaded. Without having ever consulted with de Ryckel, Captain Emile Galet who was military advisor to the king arrived at the same conclusion. He too advocated a defense closer to the border. The memoirs relating to these two strategies reveal that they had thought for a long time that the danger would come from Germany rather than France. This was the reason they wanted to mass their troops near the Meuse, at Liege and Namur.

Reaction to the ultimatum from Germany on August 2 1914 was almost one of relief. It made it possible to categorically declare which border had to be defended, and therefore the point at which the army should be concentrated. Given the dissent that reigned among his officers, King Albert I played the role of arbiter. In accordance with tradition, few sources reveal any awareness of the opinion of the sovereign. By comparing the memoirs of Baron de Ryckel and Selliers de Moranville, Christophe Bechet shows that there were some contradictions: “Both strategists seemed to think that the King was favorable to their respective convictions. My opinion is that the King, in his capacity as sovereign, tried not to offend either of them”.