One of the reasons put forward for this lack of organisation was the recent restructuring of the Belgian army. In 1909, a law was passed to modify the system of recruitment of army personnel. By imposing obligatory military service on one son per family, the law put an end to the lottery and replacement system that had been in operation up to that point. The replacement system allowed individuals who were unlucky enough to be chosen to have themselves replaced for a fee. In 1913, Albert1 generalized military service. However, several years would have been necessary for these measures to take their full effect. In 1914, there was not enough time for army numbers to be increased by future generations of army recruits and it is for this reason that military planning was not yet well devised.

In addition to this lack of organization and foresight, there was profound doctrinal disagreement between the main officers of the chiefs of staff. During the first few hours of war, there was still a lot of debate concerning the date of mobilization, the location at which the army should be concentrated, the enemy to be fought and even the location the troops should retreat to. During the first weeks of the conflict, the Belgian sovereign and his advisers were confronted by major dilemmas relating to the defense of the national territory.

When to mobilize?

One essential criterion determined the date of mobilization: it must not take place too late. In order to avoid a surprise attack across the Belgian territory, the officers wanted to be ready before the Germans and the French. If the Belgian territory was invaded too early, its small size would enable the aggressor to destabilize the entire system of mobilization and take control of the main communication channels in a very short space of time. “A well-directed cavalry attack by the enemy was all that would be required to reach Liege in a few hours, blow up a railway line or take control of a fort”, explains Christophe Bechet.

Based on the experience acquired by Belgian diplomacy during previous conflicts, certain officers had reservations about the idea of mobilizing too early. An over-hasty mobilization could be interpreted by the French and Germans as a sign of defiance or hostility towards them. This was all the more true because at the moment when Belgium mobilized the Germans and the French had not yet declared war on each other. There was therefore a high risk of intensifying tensions and hastening the start of the conflict. Despite these scruples, mobilization was ordered on July 31 1914 as all the signs suggested that war was imminent. One day later, France and Germany mobilized in turn.

Should troops should be concentrated at the threatened border or in the center of the country?

Among the chiefs of staff, a heated debate divided those in favor of concentrating troops on the border and those who were in favor of concentrating troops in the center of the country. While the former were in favor of massing troops on the border, the latter wanted to concentrate troops in a fixed area near the fortified position of Antwerp.

The fortified position of Antwerp was the keystone of the Belgian defensive system and had been chosen as the place of retreat for the Belgian army in 1859. A depot for food and ammunition, this fortified position was also “the last point to which the Belgian army could retreat and try to defend the national sovereignty, the place to which all the different forces could evacuate once they had resisted the invader”. This camp allowed for the possibility of a push by the British who could reach Antwerp through the mouth of the Scheldt.