The year 2014 will mark the centenary of the First World War. The occasion will present an opportunity to take another look at the early moments of this conflict in Belgium. A fascinating account of these events by Christophe Bechet, Doctor of History at the University of Liege, immerses us in the history of our country with a meticulous reconstruction of the days that led up to the violation of Belgian neutrality. By taking another look at the decisions taken by the main strategists of this time, the young historian demonstrates the hesitations and controversies that faced strategists just a few hours before the commencement of hostilities.
![Soldats grande guerre]( "Soldats grande guerre.")
What factors influenced the choices faced by the main Belgian strategists on entering the war in August 1914? Whether consciously or unconsciously, the choices made by the Belgian officers and high-command on entering the war in 1914 were the result of the cultural and strategic environments they experienced. Their training in the military academy, the study of military journals or their knowledge of the military history of the previous decades influenced the decisions taken.
Focussing on the combatants’ environment, this article by Christophe Bechet is part of a series of conferences on the experience of combatants from the 19th to the 21st century. Organized by Professor François Cochet of the University of Lorraine (Metz), the objective of these study days was to establish a typology of the combat experience of soldiers which had rarely been taken into consideration up to that point. While history has always focused on the study of the strategic, diplomatic or economic strategies of war, the series of conferences entitled “Combat experience” modernizes the current approach to war by exploring the different dimensions of the combatants’ experience on the field of battle. In October 2012, the third edition of this program, a record of which is available on the Éditions Riveneuve website, focused on the different environments faced by the combatants. In Novembre 2013, The fourth edition will focus on the physical and psychological trauma experienced by the combatants.
In order to explore the intellectual environment of Belgian war strategy, the Liege-based historian proposes a modern approach to known military sources such as the recollections of senior officers, and to lesser-known sources such as reports on the fortification of Liege and the strategic studies released by the Fonds Moscou which is preserved in the Royal Army and Military History Museum in Brussels.
His article deals with three important questions: When should the Belgian army mobilize? What attitude should the army adopt after mobilization? Should the army link up with a relief force in case of invasion? These were the questions faced by King Albert 1 and his entourage during the three first weeks of the conflict. Although the mobilization phase was well prepared, the same could not be said of the operations that succeeded it.
When war broke out, Belgium did not have a clearly-defined war plan, unlike Germany and France whose plans had been ready for a long time. The senior chiefs of staff had certainly prepared the theoretical documents for war but these were not translated in a concrete and pragmatic way due to lack of organization or will. For example, no pot-mobilization transport plan was devised for Belgian soldiers. The minister for railways was not advised as to the number of men to be transported, the quantity of trains to provide or the itineraries to plan for. Therefore there was a certain amount of anarchy and uncertainty in Belgium in the hours leading up to the start of the Great War.
