EURATOM and its repercussions

If the fundamental discoveries in nuclear physics were the work of Europeans, it was to the United States that the developments of the Second World War offered an obvious technological advance, in every of the applications of atomic science. As a result, certain European States would try to combine their attempts to make up the gap. But it then appeared clear that this co-operation would remain restricted to the scientific and technical aspects of nuclear energy, without being extended to political factors, which remained the prerogative of the nation States. It was on this basis that the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) was created, through a treaty signed in Rome in 1957 which also established the European Economic Community (EEC). The EURATOM treaty was thus designed as a tool aiming to the most effective promotion of nuclear energy within the Europe of Six (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg), but did not concern itself with questions related to the proliferation of atomic weapons. But from the creation of the IAEA in 1957 and, above all, the signing of the NPT in 1968, nuclear non-proliferation became an essential theme of international politics. Certain EURATOM Member States came to agree on the necessity of progressively establishing a co-ordination of the different national non-proliferation policies, first of all to maintain equal competition conditions, both within and outside the European Community (EC). The discussions were grim, extremely laborious and influenced both by successive enlargements of the EU and by international events such as, for example, the discovery of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons programme. It is nevertheless indisputable that the EU has been involved in a slow but sure process of co-ordinating national WMD non proliferation policies. Nevertheless this process seems to be more the result of a wish to align the non proliferation policies of the main supplier States across the world than a strictly European volition. In effect European alignment is in reality nothing but the expression of decisions taken within the framework of international non-proliferation bodies such as the NSG and the MTCR.

A world without nuclear technology? Just try it!

Between the vain United States hope to claim a monopoly of nuclear technology and today, 67 years have passed. They have seen the number of countries who possess, with variable quantities and quality, a nuclear arsenal, or at the very least an ‘embryonic’ atomic weapon, climb from one to nine: the United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea. The nuclear non proliferation policies and systems have thus only partially achieved their objectives, in slowing the proliferation process if not being able to curb it. But maybe this is nonetheless an appreciable result: we might effect wonder what would have happened, over this time, if no constraints had hobbled the appetite for power expressed by several countries.

Throughout the whole of this time civil and peaceful applications of nuclear energy have gone through different phases. The euphoria of the years 1954-1964 was followed by a considerable industrial boom in electro-nuclear programmes in the industrialised countries. Nuclear electricity then appeared as the panacea to remedy the ever growing needs of the industrialised world and seemed to guarantee it a certain independence in energy terms. Paradoxically the petrol crises at the end of the 20^th century, justifying an acceleration of electro-nuclear programmes, saw the appearance in Western Europe of the first protest movements against the civil use of nuclear power. Its being brought into question by green politics would waken growing distrust amongst the population. Despite the progress in imaging, diagnostics and metabolic radiotherapy, which opened up promising new pathways to medicine, the positive image of civil nuclear power would take a serious knock from the explosion of the Chernobyl reactor in 1986. It would be even more the case due to the disaster which occurred in the Japanese power stations at Fukushima in 2011. To various degrees these accidents slowed down electro-nuclear programmes or in certain cases led to their abandonment. Henceforth, for the majority of European leaders, nuclear energy is no longer a godsend of modern science but a ‘necessary evil,’ only to be used to compensate for the rarefaction and increase in the costs of hydrocarbons, whilst waiting for the availability of new energies in sufficient quantities.

That said, the contribution of nuclear energy to the global production of electricity has held steady around 25% over the past fifteen years or so, which is far from being negligible. And the massive electricity power cuts which occurred in India, at the end of July 2012, reminds us that this country, of over 1.2 billion inhabitants, which is lacking over 10% of electricity capacity, only uses nuclear energy to the tune of…3% of its production. There thus remain growth margins for the electro-nuclear industry, whether in India, in China or other regions of the world experiencing strong economic and demographic growth. In the same way it seems a reasonable bet, whilst deploring it, that the desire for power or security needs will not be restricted to the nine nuclear arsenals catalogued today, and that the fight against proliferation will remain more necessary than ever. It is in this context that Quentin Michel’s book demonstrates, through its rigour and the clarity of its analyses, all of its relevance.