These various ‘informal instruments’ were created, successively, to overcome the deficiencies of those which preceded them, and which had not prevented the appearance of new nuclear powers. Certain of these agreements remain confidential, even secret. Is that to say that such ‘instruments’ are lacking any mandatory legal value? Not so fast! These acts create obligations in terms of how participating States act; they are genuine conventional commitments, ‘contracts.’ And, if not respecting the obligations which stem from them is not sanctioned by law, it will be in other ways. If a State fails to match its commitments in the framework of an informal agreements, it will be rapidly sanctioned diplomatically or economically by the other partner States.

The ‘informal instruments’ in terms of nuclear proliferation have the objective of organising, on the basis of precise norms, the nuclear trade relationships between the participating States, both between them and between third party States. And a State not respecting the commitments it has made always risks provoking an immediate response by the other States who have placed their political commitments over their economic and commercial interests, by refusing to enter into competition to be granted a dubious market.

Curbing the temptations of trade

The four informal instruments concerning the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons establish several transfer monitoring systems. The Zangger Committee is explicitly linked to the NPT. It rounds out and executes those of its clauses which outlaw the transfer of goods related to nuclear weapons to countries which do not have them. Another ‘informal instrument,’ the NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group) aims at a harmonisation of the policies of transferring nuclear goods between the principal States which possess and which supply nuclear knowledge. These countries endeavour to reach agreements over minimal competition regulations, in order to avoid damaging the fight against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In concrete terms, and to put it ‘bluntly,’ the NSG is regularly led to ‘clamp down’ when it appears that certain of its Member States have contributed, deliberately or otherwise, to certain countries’ proliferation activities. That was the case in particular with Iraq’s clandestine nuclear programme and the behaviour of North Korea. This ‘deviant behaviour’ led the NSG members to impose increased severity in the transfer of dual use technology products.

The MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) aims at co-ordinating policies preventing a transfer of technology related to missiles contributing to the use and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The Wassenaar Arrangement, designed within a more global perspective, has been established to ‘contribute to [...] international security in promoting transparency and a greater responsibility in transfers of conventional weapons, dual-use goods and technologies, in order to prevent destabilising accumulations,’ notably in high risk zones. Transfers of dual-use goods are being more and more strictly supervised.

An analysis of the different instruments, formal (NPT) and informal, shows that the co-ordination national systems for monitoring nuclear transfer depends strongly on the political will of the States and the balances of power between them. This factor conditions the national legislative systems being brought into line and being put into practice, in the sense that the Member States assume their obligations according to the credit they grant to an at least equivalent application by the other countries. To put it crudely: as we are all engaged in trade, let’s not try to be more Catholic then the Pope, at the risk of losing orders!