But the greatest concerns originated in Iraq, a NPT signatory, but whose clandestine nuclear programme was discovered at the end of the 1990-1991 ‘Gulf War.’ Revelations about the scale of the Iraqi military research programme sparked an unprecedented crisis for anti-nuclear weapon proliferation systems. They in effect showed that NPT ratification and safeguard agreements with the IAEA did not sufficiently ensure the absence of ‘proliferation activities.’ NPT ratification even ensured a certain respectability for Baghdad, which regularly subjected its nuclear installations to checks by the Agency, without its inspectors having observed any misappropriation of the materials used. But they did not visit Iraq’s clandestine sites, not declared to the IAEA, because at the time did not have a mandate which allowed it to inspect possible suspect sites, which it does have now. In addition Iraq made use of dual use technology products, camouflaging their final use under requests for export licences aimed at agricultural, medical, etc. uses. Cleverly benefiting from the flaws in the system, Saddam Hussein’s underlings also benefited from a certain laxity on the part of the states belonging to the Iraq Nuclear Suppliers Group,(3) not too particular because more concerned with defending their commercial interests than scrupulously keeping a watch over non-proliferation, at the risk of having profitable markets stolen by competing countries. Finally, Iraq benefited from the informal support of the United States, the USSR and their allies during the war which set it against the Iran of Imam Khomeini, between 1980 and 1988.

Tightening the screws against the cheats

In 1992, the irregularities noted by IAEA inspectors in North Korea ended up convincing the international community that a more restrictive export policy needed to be imposed in the future. In that year the IAEA thus undertook vast reforms aiming to strengthen its verification system, with a view to being able to flush out more effectively clandestine nuclear activity, undeclared to the Agency. The new measures granted the Agency wider access to information, notably through samples taken in the environment, and an extended physical access through impromptu inspections.

Following the September 11, 2011, attacks, the international community became aware of the risk represented by terrorist groups acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The UN’s Security Council thus adopted a series of measures, including resolution 1504 in 2004, through which the Member States agreed to prevent non-State groups gaining access to WMD or their vectors, to no longer offer them assistance, and to adapt their respective national legislations to bring them into line with these obligations. Resolution 1540 was designed as an extra instrument aimed at strengthening the international non-proliferation of WMD system, including the NPT.

In terms of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the States were loath to make concrete their political commitments through ‘formal’ and official treaties or agreements, whose precision and clarity ruled out any ambiguity. That is why there exist few formal instruments, in this area, such as the NPT. That is also why the majority of the instruments which constitute nuclear law are more a matter of vague principles than genuine commitments embodying precise obligations on the part of the States. Why? Because the multiplicity of political, strategic and economic interests which are in play in this delicate area do not push the States to commit in a too restrictive manner. That is why nuclear law is also constituted, beyond the NPT and the UN’s resolution 1504, of a certain number of ‘informal’ instruments.

(3) The main suppliers of the Iraq military nuclear programme during the 1980s were Germany, the United States, France, Italy and the United Kingdom.