Pursuant to the law of 27 April 2007, which entered into force on 1 September 2007, divorce has become easier and faster.

The objective of the reform is to limit the harmful effects of the procedures on the relationship, already damaged, between the spouses. Each separation entails in effect difficulties and it is important that these not be aggravated by procedural difficulties and futile debates over fault. The question of responsibility in the breakdown, often very difficult to resolve, thus ceases to be the focus of the procedures.

Until the entry into force of the new law, there were two procedures: divorce by mutual consent and divorce on specific cause. This 'specific cause' could be, for example, adultery, serious abuse or physical cruelty, the existence of which had to be proven.

Divorce for specific cause no longer exists. Aside from mutual consent (1), the irremediable disunity between the spouses has become the only cause for divorce. Disunity is considered 'irremediable' when it reasonably renders it impossible to continue or to resume living together. It is a state of fact, objective, observed independent of any consideration of the behaviour of the spouses while living together. The observation of this disunity may result – although rarely – from the personal belief of the judge. Proof of the irremediable disunity may be brought 'by any legal means', that is, by any means that are not prohibited by law. Mostly, it will be proved by the passage of time or by the repetition of the assertion that the couple are irremediably disunited.

However, the irremediable disunity is also considered to be established when both spouses apply for an application for divorce after more than six months of de facto separation, or when the application is repeated twice (1).

It is also established when the application is lodged by just one of the spouses after over a year of de facto separation or when it is repeated twice (2).

Finally, irremediable disunity is deemed to have been established when one of the spouses proves that the other has adopted a behaviour that renders it impossible to continue to live together. In this case, the judge may pronounce divorce immediately.

However, it is no longer necessary to prove the fault of the other spouse to end the marriage when there is no mutual consent in this. The 'irremediable disunity' thus becomes 'the' objective cause of divorce, and the observation of its existence obliges the judge to pronounce the dissolution of the marriage, without consideration for the behaviour of the spouses. The new law thus gives a right to divorce. The procedure is swift. And the role of the court has been reduced, since it limits itself mostly to observing the running of time.

The grievances between spouses may nevertheless be raised later in the event of any application for alimentary support. In this area, the new law opts for an expanded right to the support, since it is even open to the spouse who applied for and obtained the divorce. The exclusion of the right to alimentary support is only possible if the potential payor of the support can prove that the applicant has committed a serious fault making it impossible to continue to live together. However, the debate on this serious fault is completely independent of the cause of divorce.

As for the rest, alimentary support, limited in time to the duration of the marriage, will be established according to objective criteria, among which the state of need of the applicant spouse. The judge may nevertheless take account of specific circumstances, including in particular the manner in which the spouses organised their economic activity during their life together. Thus, he could consider the fact that one of the spouses had temporarily sacrificed his or her professional life to benefit the children's education, and thus to prevent that spouse from being put at a disadvantage on a long-term basis after the divorce. A wife who has been unfaithful could thus claim alimentary support if she needs it and if the couple had decided that it would be she who takes a break from her career to devote all her time to the education of the children. The support ends as of right in the event of remarriage or equal cohabitation, or by decision of the judge in the even of marital life.

The criteria, Yves-Henri Leleu notes, signify a legal and symbolic break with the old regime. Having regard to the modes of economic operation of the couple, the law of divorce no longer mixes emotion and money, and is attached to the real problems of separated couples, these being linked to the financial resources after the relationship has been mourned. It does not attach itself to either good or bad behaviour, except for the most serious. It thus relinquishes its 'sanctioning' role to assume one of guide for the needs of the spouses penalised by the economic consequences of the shared life.

(1) Divorce by mutual consent is maintained, but it has been given greater flexibility.

(2) Within short time limits, established by the judicial code, which sets the procedure in civil law.