The popular expression which says that Bolivia is “a beggar sitting on a golden throne” didn't come from geologists. It developed from centuries of geopolitical greed rather than from rigorous and detailed exploration of the underground. It should be recalled that the Spanish conquerors’ greatest discovery when they reached the New World was the famous Cerro Rico in Potosi and a whole stream of silver deposits (Prieto, 1977). This discovery literally turned the European economy on its head, but it never ensured access to the development of the indigenous peoples who were often reduced to forced labour in the mines (la mita). While the newly independent Bolivia of 1825 was twice as big as it stands today, successive wars, always motivated by access to resources, have scarred the territory. In 1879, Peru and Chile fought for control over strategic deposits of nitrate (fertiliser) on the Pacific coastline. For Bolivia, this resulted in loss of access to the sea ... and the at the time unknown loss of immense copper deposits now known by the names of Chuquicamata, Collahuasi, etc. ... and which contribute greatly to Chile's economic might. In 1938, a major part of Chaco was lost, this time to Paraguay ... or more specifically to the oil companies which were supporting it. Scarred by this permanent feeling of being dispossessed of its resources, Bolivia was once more to suffer the provocative wealth of the tin barons in the first half of the 20th century and made a significant contribution to the American war effort of 1940-1945 in the form of tin reserves which would later contribute to the catastrophic devaluation of this metal and the nationalisation in 1952 of all mineral activities under the auspices of COMIBOL. In the second half of the 20th century, the national mining industry was in decline, due to the lack of judicial reinvestment in production structures and also because of a significant decline in tin on the world market.

Whether for right or for wrong, genuine suspicion of foreign investors’ mining projects formed in Bolivia over this period. The popular uprising which chased FMC-Lithco from the Salar d'Uyuni in 1991, and the difficulties of getting the silver deposits in San Cristobal to operate (now 100% Sumitomo) at the start of the 2000s were fairly symbolic in this regard. As a consequence of all this, mineral resources in the Bolivian sub-soil are today under-explored and have been incorrectly assessed in terms of the international norms which establish strict definitions relating to concepts of proven, probable, and possible reserves (see Joint Ore Reserves Committee). Table 1 shows currently known reserves and the relative importance of Bolivia in the global landscape.

The other immediate consequence of these political upheavals was obviously that Bolivia is rarely considered as a country which is favourable to investors in the very long term, as is the case in the mining industry. Unsurprisingly, the Fraser Institute has regularly classified Bolivia as among the most risky destinations for private investment in the mining sector ( in 2009: 66th out of 72; in 2010: 76th out of 79 => Survey of minning companies), while Chile is classified among the most favourable destinations.

It should of course be recalled that the Fraser Institute classification takes place on the basis of an inquiry with mining companies alone and it takes nothing of what governments or populations living in the mining regions may have to say into account.

Far removed from the policies followed by its neighbours, Evo Morales's Bolivia prides itself on seeking an original way to maximise the added value on its national territory, while avoiding the exportation of raw minerals. The symbolic flag-bearer of this policy is certainly the project for developing lithium in the Salar d'Uyuni.